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GALE ON REFERENCE AND 
RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 
Andrew V. Jeffrey 
Richard Gale, in On the Nature and Existence of God, offers several reasons 
why an "historical-cum-indexical" theory of reference cannot be appropriate 
in explaining how people refer to God. The present paper identifies five 
distinct lines of argument in Gale, attempts to clarify several important 
desiderata for a successful theory of reference, and argues that Gale fails to 
discharge the burden of proof he has assumed, leaving the most important 
features of Alston's "direct reference" theory untouched. Nevertheless, it is 
conceded that some consequences of Alston's theory are quite counter-intu-
itive. The paper therefore concludes with a consideration of two alterna-
tives: either taking a hard, Alstonian line in conflict with people's linguistic 
intuitions, or striking a compromise with descriptivism along lines similar 
to those found in Gareth Evans's paper, "The Causal Theory of Names." 
In the introduction and the eighth chapter of his recent book, On the 
Nature and Existence of God, Richard Gale offers several arguments 
against the adequacy of a direct reference theory for the term 'God'.' 
After setting the context of this discussion, this paper shall divide Gale's 
comments on reference into five specific arguments and then discuss 
each argument. It is concluded that although some descriptivist element 
may be necessary to an account of how 'God' refers, Gale's arguments 
fall short of showing this to be so. 
The entire discussion concerning reference can be set, for our purpos-
es, in the context of Gale's criticism of William Alston's epistemology of 
religious experience." Alston advocates a theory according to which the 
criteria for justified judgements or reasonable beliefs vary with the sub-
ject matter in question and with the socially established belief-forming 
practice engaged in when forming beliefs about that subject-matter.3 His 
view is semi-Wittgensteinian in that he simultaneously rejects 
Wittgenstein's alleged verificationism while accepting the epistemologi-
cal pluralism implicit in the Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty." 
He therefore asserts that many (if not all) of these practices, while hav-
ing the common cognitive goal of truth (in the realist sense of correspon-
dence with mind-independent fact), cannot be adversely judged (much 
less dismissed) for failing to come up to anyone universal standard of 
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epistemic rationality.5 On such pluralistic grounds, Alston argues that 
religious belief-forming practices, specifically what he calls "the 
Christian mystical practice," should be considered on a near-par with 
sense-perceptual practice." 
An initial objection Gale poses to Alston's defense of the evidential 
status of religious experience is that whereas existential claims about 
physical objects ultimately rest on sensory experience, "claims about the 
existence and nature of God need not [sic], and typically are not, based 
on religious experience, and thus religious experiences are not constitu-
tive of the religious language game."7 Gale claims that rather than using 
their own or others' religious experiences to anchor their ostensibly ref-
erential uses of the name 'God', believing participants typically "do so 
via the use of descriptions .... " He concludes: "Religious experiences 
are not constitutive of any doxastic practice, but instead are an inessen-
tial part of the encompassing religious language game."s Gale's demand 
that religious experience be "constitutive" of the religious language is 
based on a comparison with our sense perceptual knowledge of the 
physical universe. The basic idea is that religious doxastic practices 
must resemble our doxastic practices concerning the physical world in 
every important respect if the former are to approximate the latter's cog-
nitive respectability. 
But, Gale notes, Alston has a reply to the above objection. 9 Alston 
accepts a theory of direct reference according to which the reference of a 
word need not be mediated through any associated descriptive sense. 1D 
Any good theory of reference is going address two distinct issues. First, 
it has to give an account of how the references of genuinely referring 
expressions are originally fixed. Second, it must also give an account of 
how reference is transmitted, or of how language users employ two 
tokens of a term or sign to refer to the same thing. Alston holds, for 
example, that the reference of 'God' in the Christian community's non-
experiential doxastic practices (forming beliefs via consultation with reli-
gious authorities and teachers, consulting scriptures, reading and doing 
theology, etc.), as well as in its non-doxastic practices (worship, prayer, 
etc.), is originally pinned down by or historically grounded upon pri-
mordial religious encounters, such as, perhaps, God's revelation to 
Abraham. The perpetuation of coreferential uses of 'God' then involves 
the name's being passed on from person to person, with the vital condi-
tion being that each new individual learning the name intends to use it 
with the same reference as the person from whom she heard it. Alston 
never denies that descriptivist modes of reference are also employed in 
talk about God; his claims are rather, first, that the employment of iden-
tifying descriptions is not the only way to refer to God, and second, that 
direct reference is "more fundamental" to talk about God than descrip-
tivist reference. l1 
Gale's opposing theory is mainly descriptivist with some "historical-
causal" elements thrown in. He employs what he calls a "bundle ver-
sion of the cluster theory," according to which the reference of 'God' is 
both originally fixed and principally transmitted via a set of associated 
descriptions that gains some members and loses others over timeY On 
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such an account, a reference might be fixed via one description in one 
generation, but associated with very different descriptions by subse-
quent generations, reference being preserved across generations by the 
later cluster of descriptions' being historically connected to earlier clus-
ters in appropriate ways. Gale allows that reference to God might be 
secured in non-descriptive ways some of the time, but he rejects the 
notion of an original ostensive "baptism" mediated by a revelatory reli-
gious experience. That descriptivist modes of reference are employed in 
talk about God is therefore not a point of dispute between Gale and 
Alston; rather, their dispute centers around the ways in which the refer-
ence of 'God' might have been initially fixed, and the relative priority of 
the different modes of reference in transmission. According to Gale, 
contemporary religious sophisticates paradigmatically fix their reference 
to God using definite descriptions which also perform an overrider 
function in theological discourse by limiting the degree to which concep-
tions of God can vary and still be conceptions of the same thing. 13 For 
Alston, the individual's reference to God is typically fixed without 
employing any definite descriptions through learned usage in a reli-
gious community, or through a linguistic community's association with 
a religious community.14 
By this author's count, Gale advances five specific objections to what 
he calls Alston's "historical-cum-indexical" theory of reference as 
applied to the term 'God'.JS Let us call these objections the Non-ostensi-
bility Objection, the Definition Objection, the Ontological 
Presuppositions Objection, the Opinion Poll Objection, and the Biblical 
Illiteracy Objection. In offering these objections, Gale has assumed the 
burden of proof for descriptivism and against Alston's direct reference 
theory. In what follows, it will be argued that Gale fails to completely 
discharge the burden he has assumed. 
The Non-ostensibility Objection 
The first objection appears in the introduction of Gale's book: 
First, because God is a supernatural being, he seems to defy 
being indexically pinned down or baptized. There are no lapels 
to be grabbed hold of by a use of "this." Some would contend 
that we can ostensively pin down the name "God" by saying 
"this" when having or after just having a mystical or religious 
experience, in which "this" denotes the intentional accusative or 
content of the experience. This would seem to require that these 
experiences are cognitive and that their objective accusative is a 
common object of the experiences of different persons as well as 
of successive experiences of a single person .... 16 
Gale's point is that the applicability of an historical-cum-indexical 
theory of reference to 'God' presupposes the cognitivity (and hence the 
veridicality) of theistic experience, i.e., that the experiences actually rep-
resent contact with a genuine supernatural being; but in the chapter on 
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religious experience in the same book, Gale advances a complicated 
argument against the veridicality of religious experiences based on what 
he takes to be a priori requirements for veridicality that the putative 
objects of religious experiences typically cannot satisfy. As this argu-
ment is rather detailed, and involves issues other than those directly 
connected with reference, it cannot be dealt with in this paper. The 
point that needs to be made at present is that the religious language-
game could be played as if theistic experiences were both veridical and 
cognitive even if they actually were not; i.e., people could play the refer-
ential game even with a radically misidentified referent. Thus, Gale's 
argument against the veridicality of religious experiences turns out to be 
compatible with the historical-causal component of Alston's theory of 
reference for 'God'. As Gale has subsequently remarked, so long as it 
did not presuppose an initial ostensive baptism, he would have little 
quarrel with a theory of reference for 'God' that explained sameness of 
reference over time in terms of lineages of linguistic usage. '7 In the same 
place, Gale distinguishes between "indexical", "externalist", and "inten-
tional" versions of the causal theory of reference. He identifies Alston's 
view as an externalist theory, according to which "the referent picked up 
... is whatever was in fact the external cause of the seminal religious 
experiences."" Both the externalist and intentional theories can be "his-
torical-sans-indexical" in the sense that they base sameness of reference 
on lineages of linguistic usage, while being compatible with the impossi-
bility of indexically referring to God; but the "intentional" version 
favoured by Gale also postulates a shared core of associated descrip-
tions. To see why, let us turn to Gale's second major line of attack on 
direct reference for 'God'. 
The Definition Objection 
The passage in which Gale presents his Non-Ostensibility Objection 
continues: 
A second disanalogy between "God" and the sort of ordinary 
proper names to which the historical-cum-indexical reference 
theory applies is that whereas it is not an analytic truth or true 
by definition that the referent of an ordinary proper name satis-
fy some description ... this does not appear to be so for "God". 
At any time at which "God" is used there will be some descrip-
tive sense that it has by definition. For example, at the present 
time it is analytically true that God is a powerful, benevolent 
being that is eminently worthy of worship and obedience. To 
this extent, "God" is not distinguishable from a natural-kind 
term, which also can have at any time a descriptive sense that is 
definitionally determined. But they part company because some 
of the descriptive properties that are definitionally tied to God 
are hard core in that we would not allow a use of "God" to be 
coreferring with ours if these properties were not at least partial-
ly constitutive of the sense of the name. 1Y 
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These "hard core" properties are "high-level, emergent properties, ... an 
individual can have ... only in virtue of the possession of other, lower-
level properties."20 Gale contrasts these hard core properties with "soft 
core" descriptive properties, which, on his version of historical-causal 
theory, can alter over time without compromising sameness of reference. 
Gale gives the changing meaning of 'gold' as an example: 
The historical-causal theory of reference also applies to names of 
natural kinds. Consider "gold" in this connection. We begin by 
ostending a paradigmatic class of specimens of gold. We then 
turn our scientists loose to investigate the nature or essence of 
these specimens. As time goes by we revise our definition of 
what constitutes the essential properties of gold, which is what 
in fact happened as the alchemist's theory gave way to that of 
modern atomic theory. Thus, the descriptive sense a name 
might have at some time is not inviolable in that a later use of it 
can be co referring even though it lacks this descriptive sense, 
due to a change in our definition of this natural kind. 2J 
Again, note that Gale is combining historical-causal and descriptivist 
theories. Kripke would deny that natural kind terms have any descrip-
tive senses.22 Also, it seems that since Gale offers the presence of hard-
core properties in the descriptive sense of 'God' as something that dis-
tinguishes 'God' from natural-kind terms, he holds all the properties 
constitutive of the senses of ordinary natural-kind terms to be of the 
soft-core variety. 
The objection to a purely causal theory of the reference of 'God' that 
can be extracted from the above passages is that 'God' is significantly 
disanalogous both to ordinary proper names, the most obvious candi-
dates for a historical-cum-indexical theory of reference, as well as to nat-
ural kind terms, which are also sometimes understood to refer in virtue 
of an historical connection to some original ostensive baptism. It is dis-
analogous to proper names in always having a descriptive sense. It is 
disanalogous to natural kind terms in that its sense includes hard-core 
properties upon which coreference depends, and, although this does not 
follow from the account given, but is argued for separately, its descrip-
tive sense does not permit indexical reference.2' All of these alleged dis-
similarities, but especially the having of an invariant descriptive sense, 
are such as to render a causal theory of reference inadequate or at least 
incomplete when it comes to explaining coreference in the case of 'God'. 
There are at least two responses to this objection. First, Gale's asser-
tion to the contrary notwithstanding, it is not really clear that 'God' 
always has some associated descriptive sense such that nothing counts 
as God unless it satisfies the relevant description. It could be conceded 
that if one attended exclusively to the philosophical literature on the 
subject, or to the dogmatic theology of various organized religions, one 
might be tempted to suppose with Gale that power, benevolence, and 
worthiness of worship were analytic of the concept of God. But, as any-
one who has ever taught an introductory course in the philosophy of 
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religion knows, many students will question these alleged linguistic 
truths in a way they would never question, say, the masculinity of bach-
elors. If one is taking the concept of God most commonly employed in 
our culture, and not merely a philosophically refined version of that 
concept as the object of one's philosophical inquiry, then these students' 
contentiousness cannot be put down to mere linguistic incompetence in 
the area of God-talk.'" Even among the theological elite, that God pos-
sesses attributes such the ones under consideration is open to dispute in 
a way that simple analytic truths would not be.20 If possession of these 
properties is analytic of the concept of God some person employs, it can 
only be because he or she has determined to use 'God' in such a way as 
to make this true. 
Second, even if it were conceded for the sake of argument that 'God' 
always had some descriptive sense or other, it would still be the case 
that its being associated with a cluster of definite descriptions was a log-
ically distinct thesis from the claim that the term referred in virtue of 
(some set of) those descriptions. What a term means is a question of 
what descriptions language users might substitute for it in a given con-
text. How a term refers is quite another matter. One source of this doc-
trine of the independence of meaning and reference is Kripke's Naming 
and Necessity. In it, Kripke draws a sharp distinction between theories 
of reference and theories of meaning.26 He also claims that: 
... in the case of species terms as in that of proper names, ... 
one should bear in mind the contrast between the a priori but 
perhaps contingent properties a term may carry, given by the 
way its reference was fixed, and the analytic (and hence neces-
sary) properties a term may carry, given by its meaning. For 
species, as for proper names, the way the reference of a term is 
fixed should not be regarded as a synonym for the term.27 
Kripke in fact thinks a natural kind term's reference could be fixed via 
a description without that term's thereby being synonymous with that 
or any other description. os If a term's reference is fixed descriptively, as 
Kripke admits was the case with the planet Neptune (79n), then it could 
be said that the term in question had a descriptive sense, but this sense 
still wouldn't be a synonym for the term. Remember that Kripke criti-
cizes Frege for conflating two separate senses of 'sense:' u . .. for he takes 
the sense of a designator to be its meaning; and he also takes it to be the 
way its reference is determined."29 And if the reference of a term is fixed 
non-descriptively, say, via indexical dubbing, it is hard to see how there 
could even be a question of synonymy. 
Now it is one thing to suppose, as Kripke does, that a term could refer 
in virtue of some description without that description's capturing the 
meaning of (and thus being synonymous with) that term, and quite 
another to suppose that it is also possible that a term's meaning could be 
captured by some description without that term's referring in virtue of 
that or any description. Yet (apart from Kripke's reservations about nat-
ural kind terms' ever having synonymous descriptions) the latter is not 
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logically incompatible with the former. Moreover, something like the 
latter circumstance is alleged to occur on Gale's view, at least as regards 
'gold'. If alchemical and post-alchemical uses of the term are corefer-
ring, then either their senses jointly share something like hard-core 
properties in addition to the changing ones/o or the two uses corefer in 
virtue of a common history going back to original cases of ostensive 
dubbing, and not in virtue of a common sense at all. With respect to nat-
ural-kind terms, Gale plainly prefers the second disjunct. But, if 'gold"s 
having (at some time t) a descriptive meaning does not tell us what the 
circumstances are in which 'gold' refers, why should we take it that the 
having, even if at all times, of the same descriptive meaning tells us what 
the circumstances are in which 'God' refers? The answer cannot simply 
be because some features of the latter term's descriptive meaning remain 
unaltered and ipso facto shared over epoches. To use this alleged dis-
analogy in the character of the term's descriptive meaning to show that 
its mechanism of reference is different begs the question. To show that 
'God' must refer descriptively, it must be shown that some descriptive 
properties built into the definition of 'God' are essential to successful 
coreference--thus making 'God' an exception to the rule that applies to 
natural-kind terms. Gale only asserts this to be the case. Yet since he 
embraces the doctrine of the independence of meaning and reference 
with respect to natural-kind terms, he surely needs more than the avail-
ability of an alternative account of reference to demonstrate that a causal 
account alone would be incomplete in the case of 'God'. He needs other, 
independent grounds for supposing the causal theory of reference to be 
insufficient in the case of 'God' before he offers hard core properties as 
an alternative explanation for sameness of reference."1 
Against the thesis that reference can be divorced from meaning, it 
could be argued that if the reference of 'God' were fixed by saying "God 
is the object I directly experienced last night," the way this reference is 
fixed would be incompatible with its being analytically true, for 
instance, that God is a powerful, benevolent being that is eminently wor-
thy of worship. For, if the latter is what is meant by 'God', then if the 
label 'God' refers at all, it refers to something that is powerful, benevo-
lent, and worthy of worship, and the object I experienced last night 
might lack these properties.32 
There are at least two responses to the objection outlined in the para-
graph above. The first stems from Kripke's pragmatic distinction 
between speaker's reference and semantic reference. 33 Although the fol-
lowing is not an exact quote, semantic reference can be defined as the 
reference of a designator as determined by the conventions of a speak-
er's idiolect or language, given various facts about the world. 34 Kripke 
(tentatively) defines the speaker's referent as that object which the 
speaker "wishes to talk about, on a given occasion, and believes fulfills 
the conditions for being the semantic referent of the designator."35 This 
distinction is, in and of itself, neutral with respect to descriptivist versus 
causal accounts of how the (semantic) reference of 'God' is fixed, but 
notice: given this distinction and a descriptivist account of the reference 
of 'God', a speaker could use 'God' to refer to an entity she encountered 
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the previous evening, and thereby be implying that the being she 
encountered was necessarily powerful, benevolent, and eminently wor-
thy of worship. Likewise, on a causal-historical account of the reference 
of 'God', philosophical theologians may be using 'God' to talk about an 
hypothetical being necessarily possessing various attributes, and be 
wrongly (or rightly but serendipitously) attributing these attributes to a 
real entity. The point in either case seems to be that the speech-act by 
which a speaker fixes the referent of a term on a given occasion need not 
be compatible with the semantic analysis of the term. 
Secondly, even if the distinction between speaker's reference and 
semantic reference does not falsify the objector's argument, there is a 
question about the argument's validity. The premise of the argument is 
that if a there is some description that could, contra Kripke, be substitut-
ed for a general term as its meaning in a particular context, then there 
could not be another description, distinct from the first, in virtue of 
which the term refers. If by 'God' one means "whatever I encountered 
last night," then one does not mean "a being that is powerful, benevo-
lent, and eminently worthy of worship." Of course, it could turn out to 
be true of the being encountered that it was powerful, benevolent, and 
eminently worthy of worship. And thus one could, in using 'God' in the 
first sense, be referring to a being answering to the latter description. 36 
But one couldn't insist that some description encapsulated what one 
meant by a term, and still claim that one was fixing the reference of that 
term via an entirely different description. 
But none of the above is sufficient to warrant the clause, "it is this 
meaning in virtue of which 'God' refers, if it refers at all." This clause 
says that if a term has a descriptive meaning, then that meaning must be 
that in virtue of which the term refers. But all the first point really 
shows is that if a term has a synonymous description, its reference can-
not be fixed by another, entirely distinct description. It does not rule out 
the possibility that a term could be synonymous with a description (or 
disjunction of descriptions), yet refer in virtue of something entirely other 
than a description, such as a causal history.37 The point again is that such 
facts about a term's meaning may hold even though it is still the case 
that the term refers solely in virtue of a historical relation to some origi-
nal ostensive dubbing. 
The upshot of this discussion is as follows. Gale allows that a causal-
historical theory of reference is necessary to account for the coreferential 
use of natural-kind terms through meaning-shifts, in so far as these 
terms allegedly lack senses involving hard core properties. So, even if a 
term has a sense or synonymous description, this doesn't preclude its 
referring in virtue of an historical connection to an ostensive dubbing. 
While Gale writes as if the alleged disanalogy between the descriptive 
senses of 'God' and natural kind terms constituted an independent rea-
son for supposing that a purely causal theory could not completely 
account for the reference of 'God', it turns out that the type of disanalo-
gy alleged to exist, a disanalogy in how the associated senses of the 
respective terms fix their referents, presupposes the necessity of a descrip-
tivist account, thereby begging the question. It may be that the necessity 
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of a descriptivist account can be demonstrated by one of Gale's remain-
ing three objections. But, as we shall see, each of these objections have 
problems of their own. 
The Ontological Presuppositions Objection 
Gale supports his Non-ostensibility Objection with a complex argu-
ment against Alston's supposition that God could be the object of a 
veridical perception, and hence the subject of an ostensive "baptism." 
But he also objects that a good theory of reference for the term 'God' 
should make no presuppositions about whether God exists: 
That [two uses of 'God'] are coreferring should be independent 
of God's existence, and this should hold even if the referrers 
take having necessary existence to be one of God's hard-core 
properties, which would not be the case if the referent of "God" 
had to be pinned down indexically.3R 
And on page 301 he adds: 
Another fundamental inadequacy in Alston's causal theory of 
reference for 'God' is that it cannot account for how two persons 
who use 'God' can be coreferrers even if God does not exist. As 
argued in Chapter 1 [sic], our use of 'God' allows for such a case 
of intentional identity. 
At first glance, if one has Alston's indexical-causal theory in mind, 
one might take these two passages to be expressing precisely the same 
point. But in fact these passages make subtly different claims, as shall be 
shown shortly. 
Now it is obvious that if an expression lacks a referent, then no two 
individuals using it are coreferring, because neither one of them is refer-
ring. But that is as true for descriptivism as it is for the causal theory. 
The problem Gale has got his finger on is really not about coreference, 
but, as he puts it elsewhere, about intentional identity.39 How can the 
causal theorist account for two theologians' expressing the same propo-
sition, or even for their being able to disagree, without presupposing the 
existence of the referent? In the case where two individuals intend to be 
speaking of the same thing but are both mistaken in their belief that this 
thing exists or ever has existed, Gale thinks that we can only make sense 
of the intentional identity exhibited in their speech by positing some 
associated set of descriptions which both speakers have in mind. With 
this clarification made, the argument from intentional identity against a 
causal theory of reference for the term 'God' might be put as follows: 
(1) An adequate account of intentional identity should not presup-
pose the existence of a term's referent. 
(2) A causal theory of reference for 'God' must presuppose that God 
exists (or at least once did exist). 
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(3) Therefore, a causal theory of reference cannot supply an adequate 
account of how intentional identity is preserved in talk about 
God. 
The first premise is motivated by the intuition that we can enter into 
common discourse about entities even when these entities are fictive or 
mythical. The reason for (2) is supposed to go like this: On a descrip-
tivist account, sameness of intentional object occurs when two language 
users employing a term have the same descriptive sense, or at least a 
sufficient number of clauses from an associated bundle of descriptions, 
in mind. The existence of the referent is not necessary. But how else, if 
not by presupposing God's existence, can a causal theory of reference for 
the term 'God' explain intentional identity in talk about God? This is 
where the subtle distinction between the two passages quoted above 
comes in. If by a causal theory of reference one means an indexical-
causal theory, the above argument is surely sound-but not because of 
its causal elements. An indexical theory concerning how a term acquires 
its reference surely must presuppose the existence of its referent. But it 
is the causal-historical component of Alston's theory, the part concern-
ing how the reference of a term is transmitted from one person to anoth-
er, that would have to be refuted in order to show the necessity of 
descriptivism. And a good case can be made for the claim that a causal 
theory of (co-)reference need not presuppose a real-world referent. 
To begin with, the assumption that intentional identity requires a 
descriptive backing needs to be questioned. Gareth Evans, in criticizing 
the view that "to have an intention or belief concerning some item 
(which one is not in a position to demonstratively identify) one must be 
in possession of a description uniquely true of it", remarks: 
We constantly use general terms of whose satisfaction condi-
tions we have but the faintest idea. "Microbiologist," "chlorine" 
(the stuff in swimming pools), "nicotine" (the stuff in cigarettes); 
these (and countless other words) we cannot define nor offer 
remarks which would distinguish their meaning from that of 
closely related words. It is wrong to say that we say nothing by 
uttering sentences containing these expressions, even if we 
recoil ... from saying that what we say is determined by those 
hazy ideas and half-identifications we would offer if pressed:o 
But if it is false that even a single speaker need be able to supply a 
uniquely identifying description of that about which she speaks, how 
could such a description be a necessary condition for intentional identity 
of reference between two speakers? Again, Gareth Evans: 
A group of people are having a conversation in a pub, about a 
certain Louis of whom S has never heard before. S becomes 
interested and asks: 'What did Louis do then?' There seems to 
be no question but that S denotes a particular man and asks 
about him. Or on some subsequent occasion S may use the 
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name to offer some new thought to one of the participants: 
'Louis was quite right to do that.' Again he clearly denotes 
whoever was the subject of conversation in the pub. This is dif-
ficult to reconcile with the description theory since the scraps of 
information which he picked up during the converstion might 
involve some distortion and fit someone else much better.41 
The same considerations will apply in religious contexts. A six-year old 
is already just as capable of referring to God as an adult, in virtue of her 
membership in the same linguistic community. Yet if one asked the six-
year old who she thought God was, one might be told that God was a 
person who lived a long time ago when there weren't any shoes, and 
that God took care of the animals and had the only cup-everyone else 
had to drink out of their hands. Theology and even worship are a ways 
off, developmentally speaking. So, in some sense, there is a difference 
between what she and the rest of us mean by 'God', where speaker's 
meaning is understood in terms of the alternative descriptions the 
speaker offers in explaining his or her use of a phrase. But that does not 
mean there is any difference in what we refer to. Finally, if it is implau-
sible to suppose that we need attach equivalent descriptive senses to a 
term in order to corefer with each other, it is even more implausible to 
suppose such a requirement would hold in the case of coreference across 
epochs. Historically, the real Abraham could have been a henotheist, 
the concept of monotheism having developed later in the Prophetic Era. 
Yet knowing this, someone in the Judeo-Christian tradition today could 
still insist that she worshipped the God of Abraham. 
On a causal theory of reference, a language-user's intention to use a 
term as the other members of his or her social group use it is sufficient 
for sameness of reference or intentional identity. Following Donnellan, 
we can say that when the history of a singular term begins in a way that 
precludes a real world referent from being identified, it ends in a 
"block"42 For example, if someone began using a proper name from a 
fictitious story in the mistaken belief that the story was a factual account, 
the history of that person's use of that name ends in a block Donnellan 
suggests that a negative existence statement is true just in case the histo-
ry of the singular term in the statement ends in a block To counter the 
objection that this account seems to make the truth of negative existence 
statements depend upon facts about language, e.g., the history of a 
proper name, rather than upon facts about the world, Donnellan also 
suggests that two distinct negative existence statements-with different 
singular terms-can express the same proposition if the blocks in the 
histories of the terms are related in the right way. Thus, when an 
American child says "Santa Claus does not exist," and a French child 
says "Pere Noel n' e;iste pas," the two are both expressing the same propo-
sition about the world. If Donnellan is right, then we can conclude that 
when two or more uses of a term end in a common "block," or in blocks 
sharing the right kind of historical connection, the statements in which 
these uses appear preserve intentional identity, i.e., are "about the same 
thing," despite the statements' lack of a real world referent. 43 It further 
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follows that whether a singular term refers to an actual object is equally 
beside the point on either a descriptivist or a causal theory of reference. 
The Opinion Poll and Biblical Illiteracy Objections 
In his chapter on religious-experience arguments, Gale adds two final 
reasons for rejecting the appropriateness of applying a "historical-cum-
indexical reference theory" to uses of 'God'. 
Alston, following his aforementioned theory to one of its conse-
quences, rhetorically asks, if it were the case that the Biblical patriarches 
had actually been in effective contact with Satan rather than God, would-
n't the Christian community have to admit that it was, "despite our 
bandying about of descriptions that fit the only true God," referring to 
and thus addressing Satan in its prayers and worship, and thus a Satan-
worshipping community?4' But while he clearly intends this hypothetical 
question to be answered affirmatively, he seems to have given Gale the 
key to his own rebuttal, for Gale reports that in his own informal poll of 
religious believers, using the very question Alston asked, all the believers 
he asked disagreed with Alston, replying negatively. Gale takes this uni-
form rejection of Alston's hypothetical conclusion as good anecdotal evi-
dence against Alston's theory as to how coreferential uses of the term 
'God' actually work in religious practice, concluding: 
I do not doubt that there are Orthodox Jews and Christian 
Fundamentalists whose religious language game fits Alston's 
causal theory of reference, but it certainly does not properly 
describe the religious language game of Phil QUinn's "intellectu-
ally sophisticated adults in our culture," many of whom are 
ignorant of which Biblical dignitaries were alleged to have had 
religious experiences, and thus cannot be picking up the referent 
of "God" from them and who, moreover, would not accept the 
characterization of themselves as devil worshipers or LSD wor-
shipers, if it should turn out to be the case that the experiences 
of these dignitaries were caused by the devil or LSD.45 
So here we have the last two objections to Alston's account of how 
'God' refers, and thus to treating religious experience as constitutive of 
Christian doxastic practice. The first is that, by their own account, the 
religious language-game of the "intellectually sophisticated adults in 
our culture" fixes the reference of 'God' via metaphysical descriptions. 
The second is that in order for them to be acquiring the reference of 
'God' via Biblical or other historical encounters with God, these intellec-
tual (but not necessarily Biblically literate) sophisticates must know 
which persons originally had these alleged encounters. 
Let us address the last point first, as it can be dealt with in short order 
by remarking that Gale is clearly mistaken in thinking that these intellec-
tual sophisticates would have to be able to pick out specific experients, 
Biblical or otherwise, to successfully corefer with them. It is as if he were 
thinking of the direct reference theory as another version of the theory of 
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descriptions, one that differed simply in proposing an alternative set of 
descriptions, i.e., "The God of Abraham, Issac, and Jacob," instead of "He 
than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-conceived." Instead, coreference only 
requires that the contemporary users of the term 'God' intend to use it in 
the same way as those from whom they heard it. This proximate causal 
connection, repeated over and over again, is all that is required for there 
to be the right sort of external, historical connection between contempo-
rary usage and the experience of the seminal Biblical referrers. 
As for the Opinion Poll Objection, there are two plausible responses 
available to the causal theorist. The first is to reply that Gale's poll only 
shows how people think reference is fixed in their language-game. We 
should not be surprised that the religious individuals polled would answer 
Alston's rhetorical question in the manner they did. Psychologically, being 
told that one might be unintentionally worshipping Satan would be like 
hearing it insinuated that one was the very sheltered child of a mafioso, 
only worse. Moreover, the reaction is probably paralleled by other 
responses to counter-intuitive results which accompany direct reference 
theories. Consider, for example, how many people might be surprised by 
this conclusion of Donnellan's regarding Santa Claus: 
Suppose, for example, that contrary to what we adults believe 
we know, there is, in fact, a man with a long white beard and a 
belly like a bowl full of jelly who comes down chimneys on 
Christmas night to leave gifts (the ones whose labels are missing 
about which parents worry because they don't know what aunt 
the child should write a thank-you note). We must, of course, 
imagine that it is absolutely fortuitous that our descriptions of 
Santa Claus happen to fit so accurately this jolly creature. In 
that case I do not think that he is Santa Claus. The fact that the 
story of Santa Claus, told to children as fact, is historically an 
invention constitutes a block even if the story happens to con-
tain only descriptions that accurately fit some person.4h 
One suspects that a great many people would find this result of a 
direct reference theory unintuitive-they would want to say, if such a 
case came to light, "Well, we thought we were pulling one over on the 
kids, but, what do you know, there really is a Santa Claus!" (They 
would be wrong, and in fact engaging in a new dubbing of the jolly crea-
ture described above, but that is how they would see it.) 
Gale, in correspondence with the author, claims that Donnellan's 
Santa Claus example exhibits the same sort of semantic-pragmatic con-
fusion which Kripke uncovered in Donnellan's referential! attributive 
distinction.47 Seeing the Santa Claus story as an instance of fictive dis-
course, Gale argues it would be perfectly appropriate to react with "Yes, 
Virginia, there really is a Santa Claus." 
I see the fictive use of language as a special sort of illocutionary 
act that has the normative upshot, provided there is no misfire 
due to insincerity and the like, of freeing the author from any 
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challenge of speaking falsely, at least in regard to the singular 
propositions he expresses. That it would be inappropriate, 
unfair if you like, to charge the author with saying something 
false about a real life person, does not entail that he does not do 
so. Thus, there is no semantic "block" in fictional references, 
only an illocutionary block to the appropriateness of trying to 
find a real life referent and verify whether it has the fictionally 
described properties.48 
But this is certainly not the way a causal theorist, least of all Kripke 
himself, need see things. In Naming and Necessity, Kripke considers the 
hypothetical discovery of fossils that superficially resemble the mythical 
unicorns and claims that these fossils would not be the remains of uni-
corns unless the myths were somehow historically connected with, and 
therefore about, these ancient animals,,9 Just as in the Santa Claus exam-
ple, others might say, "Well! Unicorns really existed after all." Kripke, 
like Donnellan in the Santa case, would regard these people's intuitions 
to be mistaken unless such an historical link could be established. Also, 
Kripke explicitly states that he does not regard his criticisms of 
Donnellan's referential! attributive distinction to be incompatible with 
his views on the reference of proper names, which are quite similar to 
Donnellan's.50 
Alternatively, respect for the clear-cut intuitions of Gale's respon-
dents might lead one to seek a middle ground between Gale and Alston, 
acknowledging, in the words of Gareth Evans, that "the intentions of the 
speakers to use [a name or general term] to refer to something must be 
allowed to count in determination of what it denotes."'1 Alston would 
reply that this only showed that "one would not use 'God' to refer to X 
unless one firmly believed X alone had certain characteristics."s2 
But that falls short of showing that it is the possession of those 
characteristics that makes X the referent. The arguments for the 
primacy of direct reference remain in full full force .... Our 
dupes of Satan might have a firm resolution to use 'God' to refer 
only to a being that is absolutely perfect; but, mistakenly sup-
posing the being with whom they are in contact to be absolutely 
perfect, they are using 'God' to refer to an imperfect being 
nonetheless. 53 
To further support this reply, Alston draws an analogy to Donnellan's 
case of the misdescribed imbiber. In that case, because the speaker has a 
way of directly picking out the referent, he can use a description to pick 
out a referent that does not satisfy the description. So, in the case of ref-
erential uses of 'God', Alston adds, "Here too it could well be the case 
that one would not use that description to refer to X unless one believed 
X uniquely satisfies the description; but the referent is determined other-
wise nonetheless."s. 
The plausibility of this reply depends on the relevance of the follow-
ing disanalogy between the two cases. Donnellan's mistaken speaker at 
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the party employs a description in an exceptional way; it is a case of a 
pragmatic glitch in a linguistic practice where speaker's reference and 
semantic meaning would normally coincide. But in the case of Alston's 
mistaken Satan-worshippers, we have to imagine a linguistic practice 
where speakers' reference and semantic meaning continually and sys-
tematically fail to coinicide. It's like being asked to imagine that people 
unwittingly entertain radically false beliefs about rhinoceroses every 
time they talk or think about 'unicorns', despite whatever descriptions 
and images they employ, on the grounds that the first Western account 
of unicorns was that of the Greek Historian Ctesias, who is thought to 
have been relating fanciful reports of the Indian rhino.55 It's easy to see 
why such a global disparity between the semantics and pragmatics of a 
linguistic practice would lead philosophers to call for an adjustment to 
the semantic theory that posited iU6 
How are we to understand the relation between the descriptive con-
straints arrived at through theological reflection and usage, on the one 
hand, and historical-causal mechanisms of reference-transmission in the 
religious tradition, on the other? Worship and prayer commonly bor-
row definite descriptions from theology in addressing their object. 
Theological reflection, although certainly dependent on the more 
"undergirding substance of religious activity," is not epiphenomenal to 
it. The relation, in other words, between prayer, worship, and other 
instances of "first order" religious language to the "second order" lan-
guage of theological reflection, is not a one-way street. Theological 
reflection, originating in worship and prayer, in turn informs and other-
wise affects the activities it reflects upon. Thus, if the reference of terms 
in theological discourse is sometimes fixed via definite descriptions 
(which, Alston concedes, is possible)," the same may be true of the refer-
ence of these terms when (re)employed in prayer and worship. 
An analogue of Evans's idea of "dominance" may be of service at this 
point. Evans proposes that speakers generally intend to refer to the item 
which is the causally dominant source of the information they associate 
with the term in question.5" Dominance is "not merely a function of the 
amount of information," it is also a funtion of informational detail and 
significance, as well as of deference to special groups of speakers within 
the linguistic community. 59 But since Alston assumes that what a speak-
er intends to refer to does not always guarantee what she actually refers 
to, Evans's original idea will require modification if it is to be of use in 
the present context. In any case where an item is ostensibly re-identified 
over time, there is the possibility of misidentification. In such cases, the 
Alstonian assumption would seem to be that the item picked out in the 
initial dubbing, whether ostensively or descriptively, will subsequently 
always be the real referent of the term. This does not allow for changes 
in denotation, which do occur. Evans, for instance, cites the case of 
'Madagascar,' where " ... 'a heresay report of Malay or Arab sailors ... 
has had the effect of transferring a corrupt form of the name of a portion 
of the African mainland to the great African Island."'6Q 
We should reject, then, the suggestion that causal chains of linguistic 
usage must always be linear, with the denotation of a term remaining 
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inflexibly that of its original referent. Instead, let us suppose that where 
there have been multtple re-identifications (and possible mis-identifica-
tios) over time, a term's semantic referent is that item dominantly picked 
out among the items that may have been speakers' referents at one time 
or another-and this need not remain the original referent of the term. 
This view still allows that the original reference could remain dominant, 
and so it does not automatically rule out Alston's Satanic Dupes sce-
nario, but it does more justice to the intuitions of Gales' respondents, 
and allows for the possibilty of changes in denotation in a way Alston's 
theory apparantly does not. It will also allow for a better understanding 
of religious syncretism, which figures importantly in the history of all 
major world religions, and thus in the histories of religious terms, there-
by also affecting reference in present-day religious discourse. When, for 
instance, an indigenous name of a local deity with its own etymology 
and cultural connotations is appropriated by missionaries to refer to the 
god of another religion, it would seem we must say that a descriptively 
based refixing of the name's reference occurs. But this is still compatible 
with this new reference then being transmitted non-descriptively via the 
missionary community's distinctive usage. 
Finally, suppose that 'God' really is linguistically associated with a 
certain cluster of descriptions, that 'God' really does mean such-and-
such. How would a causal theory of reference accommodate this fact? 
In the case of 'heat', we originally fix the reference of the term in this 
and every possible world via a contingent fact about the sensation it pro-
duces in us in the real world.61 It is not discoverable a priori or through 
conceptual analysis alone that heat just is molecular motion; therefore 
being molecular motion is not built into the meaning of 'heat', even if it 
does turn out to be heat's essence. The way we originally fix the refer-
ence of 'heat', by reference to experienced but contingent and therefore 
inessential qualities, does not preclude us from later affirming truths 
about its essence. On a historical-cum-indexical account, the same is 
true with respect to talk of God, i.e., the reference of 'God' is originally 
fixed by reference to experiences, ostensibly involving qualities which 
mayor may not be essential to God's nature. As it happens, supreme 
greatness and eminent worthiness of worship, the properties Gale iden-
tifies as "hard core" for God, are properties someone having a numinous 
experience could certainly ascribe to the intentional object of his or her 
experience. Indeed, whereas many philosophers have wondered how 
God could possibly be experienced as omnipotent or omniscient, rela-
tively few have regarded mystical accounts of intuited divine greatness 
and worthiness as problematic. 
Does this concede much to Gale? Not really. Descriptions and indi-
vidual intentions matter more on this view than on Alston's, but the 
points made earlier against the necessity of a descriptive backing for 
coreference still stand, and Alston's overall position that direct reference 
is <genetically) more fundamental than definite descriptions hasn't been 
touched.62 Similarly, accepting an Evans-like modification to Alston's 
theory of reference will leave intact the idea that referential success has 
little to do with the "fit" of associated desccriptions.63 The result will be 
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a more complex, less linear version of the historical-causal theory-one 
according to which reference, although transmitted causally, is repeated-
ly refixed, both via descriptions, and via experiences the intentional 
objects of which are taken to satisfy those descriptions. 
Summary 
We have attempted to sort out several distinct objections contained in 
Gale's argument against the applicability of a direct reference theory to 
theological statements. First of all, the Non-Ostensibility Objection isn't 
really an objection to causal theories of reference per se, but only to 
indexical elements in such. The objection could stand against the veridi-
cality of religious experiences without having any bearing on what role 
such experiences play in the overall religious language-game. The 
Definition Objection fails to stand as an independent objection because 
Gale has to prove that coreference across meaning-shifts must occur for 
different reasons in the case of 'God' than it does in the case of natural-
kind terms, and none of the remaining objections succeed at supplying 
the needed proof. The Ontological Presuppositions Objection falsely 
assumes that a causal theory of reference cannot explain shared meaning 
in the absence of an existing referent, while the Biblical Illiteracy 
Objection, begs the question by covertly assuming the truth of descrip-
tivism. The strongest of the objections we have considered, the Opinion 
Poll Objection, applies specifically to conclusions Alston draws from his 
version of direct reference theory. It must assume both that, in general, 
people have an accurate, intuitive grasp as to how reference actually 
works in the language-games they play, and that Alston's inferences are 
inescapably correct as to the hypothetical consequence in question. 
This concludes my remarks concerning Gale on this topic. There are 
other important issues concerning theology and direct reference that 
could be addressed, but such questions are beyond the scope of this 
paper. What has been at issue is a collection of objections to the idea 
that any predominantly causal theory of reference could hold as regards 
'God' and its cognates, and, possibly also, an objection to considering 
religious experience as a constitutive part of an over-all religious lan-
guage-game, and thus to treating religious experience's contribution to 
religious belief as on a par with sensory experience's contribution to our 
knowledge of the physical world. It may be that other reasons for 
embracing descriptivism as regards the reference of 'God' have been 
overlooked. But, if the conclusions presented in this paper are correct, 
then at least we know where the issue is not to be joined. 
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